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INTRODUCTION
The invention of and subsequent advances in digital communication have
drastically expanded the technology at a testator’s disposal for creating, executing, and safeguarding a record of testamentary intent. The expression of a message in writing no longer necessarily entails the creation of a material form, nor
is writing the only way to create a reviewable record of one’s testamentary intent. Further, the rise of electronic signatures and face-to-face communication
using electronic means and audiovisual technology has provided potential alternatives to the traditional analog execution process. As most states have now
adopted the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act and the support for remote
online notarization is growing, testators already use some of these electronic
processes to execute certain estate planning documents.1
As a result of dramatic shifts in the technological landscape, electronic
wills, or e-wills, have found their way into probate courts, legislatures, and
most recently, the Uniform Law Commission (ULC).2 Part I of this Note provides background information regarding the traditional formal requirements for
wills. Part II explores the shortcomings of the harmless error approach, establishing the need for legislatures to adopt e-wills legislation even in jurisdictions
that have enacted a harmless error provision. Finally, Part III compares Nevada’s new e-wills laws to the recently approved Uniform Electronic Wills Act
(UEWA) to conclude that, while Nevada should amend some aspects of its leg-

1

See UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT 1 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS,
Draft for Approval, 2019) (“People increasingly turn to electronic tools to accomplish life’s
tasks, including legal tasks. They use electronic execution for a variety of estate planning
documents, including beneficiary designations and powers of attorney.”); UNIF. ELEC.
TRANSACTIONS ACT (UETA), Practical Law Glossary Item 3-578-4607 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N)
(“The UETA has been adopted by 47 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands. The three states that have not adopted the UETA (New York, Illinois, and
Washington) have all adopted similar laws making electronic signatures legally enforceable.”); Margo H.K. Tank et al., Remote Online Notarization is Here to Stay, A.B.A. (July 23,
2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/committee_
newsletters/banking/2019/201907/fa_2/ [https://perma.cc/BR3R-XM6U] (“As of early May
2019, twenty-one states have passed and/or enacted RON laws.”).
2 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-2518 (2019); IND. CODE § 29-1-21-1 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 133.085 (2017); In re Estate of Horton, 925 N.W.2d 207, 209 (Mich. Ct. App. 2018); In re
Estate of Javier Castro, 27 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 412, 418 (2014); A.B. 3095, 2018 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (died in the legislature); H.B. 1403, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2018)
(died in the legislature); H.R. 169, Council 22, Reg. Sess. (D.C. 2017) (died in the legislature); H.B. 277, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017) (vetoed by the Florida Governor); S.B. 40,
2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2017) (died in the legislature); UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT (NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, Approved Draft 2019) (This Act was approved at the 2019 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws but is
still subject to revision by the Committee on Style). This note will discuss developments in
the United States only. For the international context, see Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and
Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1037, 1039 (1994).
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islation in accordance with the UEWA, certain provisions of the UEWA should
similarly mirror Nevada law.
I.

TRADITIONAL WILLS FORMALITIES

Wills have long been defined by the legal formalities that guide their creation and execution.3 American law has traditionally recognized two types of
wills, formal and holographic.4 These wills share two formalities. First, both of
these instruments must exist in writing to be accepted for probate.5 Tracing its
lineage back to the Statute of Wills of 1540, the writing requirement has historically functioned as a way to ensure that the testator’s intent is recorded at the
time it is expressed.6 Recording an expression of testamentary intent in writing
prior to the digital revolution entailed the creation of a material form. Accordingly, statutes never expressly dictated that a will must, from its inception, exist
in a material form.7 Nonetheless, writing as a fundamental formality created a
material form requirement simply as a product of the technological environment. The writing constituting either a formal or holographic will has therefore
3

Mann, supra note 2, at 1035; see John C. Fitzgibbons, An Analysis of the History and Present Status of American Wills Statutes, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 293, 293 (1967) (“The device by
which [a testator] expresses his wishes is usually called a ‘will,’ and the prerequisites which
he must meet are usually called ‘formalities of execution[]’ . . . [T]hese technical requirements . . . were first explicitly stated in modern terms by the English Statute of Frauds in
1676, later redefined by the Wills Act of 1837 and the Wills Act Amendment Act of 1852.”).
4 WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 197 (4th ed. 2001). Roughly
half of the states recognize holographic wills. ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER,
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 198 (10th ed. 2017). In addition to these two categories of traditional written wills, two states now recognize the validity of a notarized will, which involves the presence of a single notary as opposed to multiple attesting witnesses. UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-502(a)(3)(B) (amended 2008); SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra, at 197–98
(only Colorado and North Dakota have adopted UPC’s notarized will provision). Even in
states that do not recognize a notarized will, a notary can potentially serve as a witness. In re
Friedman 6 P.3d 473, 475–77 (Nev. 2000) (reviewing approaches taken by other courts and
holding that “[the notary’s] signature was sufficient to meet the requirements of an attesting
witness,” so long as the notary affixed his signature to the self-proving affidavit in the testator’s presence).
5 See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 4, at 198. Some jurisdictions recognize the nuncupative
(oral) will. Id. at 217–18. As the name suggests, an oral will is not recorded in writing (or
signed) at the time of creation. See id. at 217. Because oral wills do not comply with these
formalities, they are allowed only under exceptional circumstances, such as “in the time of
the last sickness of the deceased” or where the testator is a member of the armed services. Id.
Even if these circumstances exist, courts generally require that the oral will be recorded in
writing soon after being communicated by the testator. Id. at 198. Additionally, courts impose a heightened burden of proof and require strict compliance, meaning that formal requirements must be met with exactitude. Id. at 218; see infra Section II.A. As the path to legal recognition is a considerably narrow one, the probate of oral wills is rare even where
technically permitted. MCGOVERN ET AL., supra, at 218.
6 MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 4, at 197–98.
7 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. i
(AM. LAW INST. 1999) (“The requirement of a writing does not require that the will be written on sheets of paper, but it does require a medium that allows the markings to be detected.”).
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traditionally existed as a paper record; though, in the case of holographic wills,
there have been some peculiar exceptions.8 Second, both a formal and holographic will must be signed by the testator.9 The third formality, however, varies depending on whether the will is formal or holographic.
A formal will must be attested and subscribed by at least two witnesses in
the presence of the testator.10 In the past, a formal will’s due execution was
proven by witnesses providing testimony or submitting a sworn affidavit to the
court.11 Most states now allow for the execution of a self-proving formal will,
wherein the witnesses sign affidavits or declarations certifying that “all the
formalities were duly performed.”12 This avoids the need to supply witness testimony after the testator’s death.13 It also gives rise to a presumption of validity
that is irrefutable absent “evidence of fraud or forgery affecting the acknowl-

8

See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 190, 203 (discussing the fictional case of a
will tattooed on a young woman’s back being presented for probate and the famous, nonfictional case of a will carved into a tractor fender being successfully admitted to probate);
see also Clark Sellers, Strange Wills, 28 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 106, 106
(1937) (“Wills have been presented for probate which were written on such strange objects
as the rung of a stepladder, a match box, and even a petticoat.”).
9 SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 142, 198.
10
MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 4, at 204, 210. Jurisdictions vary on the details—such as
the number of required witnesses, who can serve as a witness, whether subscription is necessary, how to determine whether the testator signed “in the presence” of the attesting witnesses—but no jurisdiction requires an attestation clause. Id. at 203–05, 210–12; SITKOFF &
DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 148, 152–58.
11 Id. at 161. This proof requirement resulted in hardships for parties seeking to prove due
execution in court. See Harold E. Kelley, Recording of Wills, 29 KY. ST. B.J. 14, 14 (1965)
(“It is often an insurmountable task for an attorney to locate the subscribing witnesses to a
will. They may have moved, their present whereabouts unknown, they may refuse to return
to assist in proving the signature of the testator, or they may have died.”).
12 MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 4, at 204, 211. Compare the self-proving will authorized
by most states today with the solution advocated by Kelley in 1965. Kelley, supra note 11
(suggesting that the testator and one or two attesting witnesses should be able to appear before the clerk of the court to execute and potentially record a will, “enabl[ing] the executor
or his attorney to probate the document without further proof or without the necessity and
expense of searching for the subscribing witnesses.”).
13 MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 4, at 211–12; SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at
161; see supra text accompanying note 12 (discussing the problem identified and solution
advocated by Kelley). While a self-proving affidavit or declaration makes the same recitation as an attestation clause, the two are different in that the attestation clause is not sworn
under oath and therefore cannot replace a witness’s testimony. See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra
note 4, at 212; SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 161. Because the content is essentially identical, some states allow for a witness to sign only the self-proving affidavit or declaration (a one-step process). See id. Other states prefer a more technically proper execution
process and require that the witnesses first sign the will’s attestation clause and then execute
the self-proving affidavit (a two-step process). Id. UPC § 2-504 provides for both alternatives. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-504 (amended 2010); SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4,
at 161. Even though a witness need not testify if the process is properly carried out, it is
“[n]evertheless . . . advisable to use as witnesses to a will persons who are likely to survive
the testator and be able to testify if the will is contested.” MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 4, at
205.
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edgment or affidavit” under UPC § 3-406.14 The presumption is rebuttable in
jurisdictions that recognize a self-proving will but have not enacted UPC § 3406 or adopted similar language.15 In either instance, contesting the will on
formal validity grounds becomes more difficult. Unlike a formal will, a holographic will need not be attested.16 Instead, testators generally must record testamentary wishes in their own handwriting.17 Many states also require that the
holographic will be dated.18
II. E-WILLS IN THE COURTS: EVALUATING THE HARMLESS ERROR APPROACH
A. Standards of Compliance
One of the most salient points of scholarship within the field of wills,
trusts, and estates over the last half century has been the movement away from
the harsh tradition of strict compliance to the more forgiving doctrines of substantial compliance and harmless error.19 Under the traditional doctrine of strict
14

UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-406 (amended 2010).
SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 161 (citing Reeves v. Webb, 774 S.E.2d 641
(Ga. 2015)).
16 Id. at 198.
17
MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 4, at 213–14. Jurisdictions vary as to the precise degree of
handwriting required and the standards used to determine compliance. SITKOFF &
DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 208–10 (Approximately one third of states require that the will
be “entirely written, signed, and dated” in the testator’s handwriting; one third require that
the will’s “material provisions” be recorded in the testator’s handwriting and do not consider
any of the pre-printed words to provide context; finally, one third take the “material provision” approach and do allow extrinsic evidence to clarify the testator’s intent). Pennsylvania
is the only state that allows the probate of unwitnessed wills not in the testator’s handwriting.
MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 4, at 213 n.3. I initially intended to use the singular they
throughout this piece. The use of singular they is not only a practical way to deal with the
need for a singular, non-gendered pronoun, but it also avoids using “he or she,” which excludes non-binary individuals. See, e.g. Celeste Mora, What is the Singular They, and Why
Should I Use It?, GRAMMARLY (June 1, 2018), https://www.grammarly.com/blog/use-thesingular-they [https://perma.cc/DJ2F-3GB6]. Unfortunately, the Sixteenth Edition of the
Chicago Manual of Style (CMS) expressly forbids the use of the singular they, and the Seventeenth Edition allows for it in limited circumstances only. Kayleigh Fischietto, The Chicago Manual of Style on the Singular Pronoun ‘They’, (Jan. 4, 2018), https://libraries.indiana
.edu/chicago-manual-style-singular-pronoun-they [https://perma.cc/PX2S-RMRL]. Because
other authors in this issue were asked to revise in accordance with the CMS rule, I have
agreed to revise my writing as well for the sake of consistency. However, as I am a member
of the Nevada Law Journal (NLJ), I am in a unique position to advocate for a policy change
that will allow authors who purposefully use the singular they in their writing to do so in
pieces published in the NLJ. I am immensely grateful for the support expressed by the Editor
in Chief and Lead Articles Editor—as well as certain faculty members at the William S.
Boyd School of Law—in this endeavor. I am hopeful that the NLJ will adopt this policy and
encourage other law review journals to take action on this important issue.
18 MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 4, at 213.
19 David Horton, Partial Harmless Error for Wills: Evidence from California, 103 IOWA L.
REV. 2027, 2031–32 (2018) (“The harmless error rule has long been one of the few hotbutton issues in the staid field of wills.”); see John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance
with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 492–96 (1975) (relying on Lon L. Fuller, Consid15
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compliance, a will must comply with all of the applicable statutory formalities
in order to be successfully probated.20 Imperfect execution gives rise to a conclusive presumption of formal invalidity.21 Application of this doctrine prevents
false positives, wherein a will that does not express the testator’s intent is nonetheless accepted to probate.22 The prevention of false positives comes at an expense, however. Refusing probate due to an inconsequential error in execution
engenders false negatives, wherein the court denies the probate of a will that
does indeed express the testator’s intent.23 Attempting to avoid the inequitable
results of refusing probate over a miniscule mistake, some courts provided for
ad hoc relief even before the rise of substantial compliance and harmless error.24
In 1975, Professor John Langbein pushed back against this “relentless formalism” with his seminal article, “Substantial Compliance with the Wills
Act.”25 As originally articulated, substantial compliance would forgive mistakes in execution when (1) the instrument expresses the testator’s intent, and
(2) its form, while not in perfect compliance, nonetheless “enable[s] the court
to conclude that it serves the purposes of [the required formalities].”26 According to Langbein, these formalities ultimately serve four functions.27 The evidentiary function refers to the need to prove a will in court.28 The channeling function pertains to the need for a standardized form of expression, which aids
testators, attorneys, and courts.29 The cautionary, or ritualistic, function and the
protective function are both concerned with the testator.30 These functions diceration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801–03 (1941), discussing the channeling function in contract law, and Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 1–8 (1941) identifying the remaining functions) (Gulliver
and Tilson in turn cite to the “careful functional analysis” undertaken by Philip Mechem in
The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in Action Evidenced by
Commercial Instruments, 21 ILL. L. REV. 341, 348 (1926)); Mann, supra note 2, at 1033; J.
G. Miller, Substantial Compliance and the Execution of Wills, 36 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 559,
559, 562–65 (1987); C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative
Reform: An Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code “Harmless Error” Rule and the
Movement Toward Amorphism, 43 FLA. L. REV. 167, 257–58 (1991); John V. Orth, “The
Race to the Bottom” Competition in the Law of Property, 9 Green Bag 2d 47, 53 (2005).
20 SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 146.
21 Id. at 162.
22 See id. at 146.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 163.
25 Langbein, supra note 19, at 489.
26 Id.
27 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. a (AM.
LAW INST. 1999); Langbein, supra note 19, at 492–97. A fifth function, the “anti-externality
function,” has also been proposed. David Horton, Tomorrow’s Inheritance: The Frontiers of
Estate Planning Formalism, 58 B.C. L. REV. 539, 573–74 (2017) (“The idea that the Wills
Act formalities prevent negative externalities is not entirely novel.”). This concept highlights
the policy interest of protecting third parties. Id.
28 Langbein, supra note 19, at 492.
29 Id. at 494.
30
See id. at 495–96.
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tate that testators should understand the gravity of their decision, have the requisite capacity, and be free from fraud, duress, or undue influence when making
a will.31 The substantial compliance doctrine “allows a court to deem a noncompliant will to be in compliance with [the statutorily required formalities]”
when these functions are fulfilled.32
Though some states adopted a substantial compliance approach, the resulting doctrine did not facilitate the functional analysis promoted by Langbein.33
Instead, states translated substantial compliance into a watered-down near-miss
standard under which only minor deviations are considered permissible.34 In
response to the narrowing of substantial compliance, Langbein advocated for
the adoption of a harmless error approach, which originated in Australia.35 Unlike the substantial compliance doctrine, the harmless error doctrine provides
courts with the power “to excuse noncompliance if there is abundant evidence
that the testator intended the document to be his will.”36 This doctrine therefore
provides courts with a dispensing power, i.e. the ability to dispense with the
formalities altogether, so long as a proponent can prove the testator’s intent by
clear and convincing evidence.37 The functional analysis initially promoted by
Langbein still plays an important role in determining whether to exercise this
dispensing power.38 With Langbein’s support, this functionalist doctrine soon
found a home in the UPC.39 The UPC’s harmless error provision has since been
31

Id. at 491.
SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 174 (emphasis omitted).
33 Id. at 170–72, 174.
34 Id. at 174–75.
35 Gökalp Y. Gürer, Note, No Paper? No Problem: Ushering in Electronic Wills Through
California’s “Harmless Error” Provision, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1955, 1966 (2016) (citing
John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Error in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1987)).
36 SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 174.
37 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010) (imposing a clear and convincing evidence
standard); Mann, supra note 2, at 1035 (The harmless error rule “permits a court to dispense
with the formalities if it is satisfied ‘that the decedent intended the document . . . to constitute’ his or her will.”).
38 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. b (AM.
LAW INST. 1999) (“The question in each case is whether a defect in execution was harmless
in relation to the purpose of the statutory formalities, not in relation to each individual statutory formality scrutinized in isolation.”).
39 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010); Gürer, supra note 35, at 1965–66 (referring to Langbein as “the father of the [UPC’s] harmless error rule” and indicating that the
ULC amended the UPC to include a harmless error provision “[i]n response to Langbein’s
insights . . . .”); see John H. Langbein, Major Reforms of the Property Restatement and the
Uniform Probate Code: Reformation, Harmless Error, and Nonprobate Transfers, 38 AM. C.
TR. & EST. COUNS. L.J. 1, 9 (2012); Miller, supra note 19, at 258.
UPC § 2-503 provides that:
32

Although a document or writing added upon a document was not executed in compliance with
Section 2-502, the document or writing is treated as if it had been executed in compliance with
that section if the proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute:
(1) the decedent's will,
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adopted in whole or in part by eleven states.40 This provision allows courts to
excuse non-compliance with the signature and attestation requirements, but it
does not permit courts to excuse non-compliance with the writing requirement.41
In summary, the goal of the harmless error doctrine is to strike a balance
between the state’s interest in fulfilling the four functions of wills formalities
with its interest in furthering the fundamental policy behind the law of wills:
freedom of disposition.42 While these formalities further testamentary intent by
promoting testamentary capacity, protecting against fraud or undue influence,
and impressing the seriousness of a testamentary act upon the testator,43 the denial of probate based upon a mere oversight in the execution process undermines a testator’s freedom of disposition.44 Hence, if a proponent can show by
clear and convincing evidence that the testator intended to create a will, the
written instrument may be probated despite formal deficiencies.45 The harmless
error doctrine is essentially an escape hatch designed to prevent false negatives
in the probate of wills. Most states, however, still adhere to the strict compliance standard, often with ad hoc exceptions.46
B. Applying Harmless Error to E-Wills: Castro and Horton
In 2013, an Ohio probate court approved an application to probate an electronic will in the now seminal case of In re: Estate of Javier Castro.47 After refusing a lifesaving blood transfusion for religious reasons, Javier Castro decided to make a will from his hospital bed.48 He dictated and later executed an
electronic document created on a password-protected Samsung Galaxy tablet
while in the physical presence of his brothers, Miguel and Albie.49 Like Javier,
(2) a partial or complete revocation of the will,
(3) an addition to or an alteration of the will, or
(4) a partial or complete revival of his [or her] formerly revoked will or of a formerly revoked
portion of the will.
40

SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 176 (California, Oregon, Montana, Utah, Colorado, South Dakota, Michigan, Ohio, Virginia, New Jersey, and Hawaii have all adopted
some version of UPC § 2-503. California and Ohio only apply the harmless error rule to attestation errors, and in Colorado and Virginia the rule applies to only some signature errors.
Id. at n.56).
41 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010); see John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless
Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Resolution in Probate
Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 52 (1987) (discussing the “indispensable” nature of the writing
requirement). This reflects the UPC’s exclusion of oral wills. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502
(amended 2010) (providing for formal, notarized, and holographic wills only).
42 See Langbein, supra note 41, at 6.
43 See id. at 3–4.
44 See id. at 4.
45 See id.
46 SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 171.
47 In re Estate of Javier Castro, supra note 2, at 418.
48 Id. at 414.
49
Id.
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these witnesses later signed the electronic document using the tablet’s stylus
tool.50
In determining whether the e-will met Ohio’s requirements for a valid formal will, the court explicitly held that the e-will constituted a writing signed by
the testator.51 The court also indicated that the e-will had been attested and subscribed in the testator’s conscious presence by two competent witnesses.52 In
other words, Javier’s e-will met all of the statutorily required formalities of a
formal will.53 Nevertheless, rather than holding the e-will valid as a properly
executed formal will, the court applied Ohio’s harmless error provision.54 The
court tethered its application of harmless error to the absence of an attestation
clause,55 even though an attestation clause is not required under Ohio law.56
Ohio’s harmless error provision does not adopt UPC § 2-503.57 Rather than
supplying the probate court with dispensing power, Ohio’s statute allows for
the excusal of imperfect compliance when the will’s proponent proves by clear
and convincing evidence that:
“(1) The decedent prepared the document or caused the document to be
prepared.
(2) The decedent signed the document and intended the document to constitute the decedent’s will.

50

Id. at 415. Javier’s nephew arrived at the hospital later and became a third witness. He did
not see Javier sign, but Javier did acknowledge his signature. Id. at 414. Post-execution, the
e-will remained in Albie’s continuous possession, and he testified that “[it had] not been altered in any way.” Id. at 415. Testimony provided by other parties also showed that Javier
understood the nature and extent of his property and natural objects of his bounty, suggesting
that he also understood the disposition being made and relation of these three elements. Id.;
see SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 264 (providing the elements for testamentary
capacity). Further, three individuals not involved in the execution process testified that Javier
told them he had signed the will, and two of those witnesses indicated that Javier had communicated that the e-will accurately reflected his testamentary intent. In re Estate of Javier
Castro, supra, at 415.
51 Id. at 416–17.
52 Id. at 417–18.
53 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.03 (West 2019) (setting out the requirements for a valid
will). Ohio does not recognize holographic wills. See id. (recognizing only oral and formal
wills). It therefore would not have mattered if Javier had handwritten his e-will.
54 In re Estate of Javier Castro, supra note 2, at 417.
55 See id.; Kyle B. Gee, Beyond Castro’s Tablet Will: Exploring Electronic Will Cases
Around the World and Re-Visiting Ohio’s Harmless Error Statute, 26 PROB. L.J. OHIO 149,
150 (2016).
56 Estate of Snell v. Kilburn, 846 N.E.2d 572, 579 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (“R.C. 2107.03 requires only that a will be attested to by two witnesses . . . . There is no requirement that there
be an actual attestation clause . . . .”); Graham v. Tucker, 47 N.E.2d 801, 803–04 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1942) (“If necessary, both the testimonium and attestation clauses may be disregarded
as surplusage.”); In re Will of Reckard, 15 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 465, 471 (Wash. Cty. Ct. Com.
Pl. 1914) (“[A]n attestation clause though advantageous, is no essential part of a will unless
required by a statute.”).
57
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010).
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(3) The decedent signed the document . . . in the conscious presence of two
or more witnesses.”58
Without any further discussion of the facts or evidence presented, the court
found that Javier’s tablet e-will met all of these requirements and admitted it to
probate.59
The Michigan Court of Appeals recently upheld a similar decision admitting an e-will to probate under the harmless error rule in In re Estate of Horton.60 Prior to committing suicide at the young age of twenty-one, Duane Horton II created a “final note” using the Evernote app.61 He referenced this note in
an undated, unsigned, handwritten journal entry that included his Evernote login information.62 The electronic document stored on Evernote (the note) consisted of “apologies and personal sentiments[,] . . . religious comments, requests relating to his funeral arrangements, and many self-deprecating
comments . . . [as well as] one full paragraph regarding the distribution of [his]
property.”63 The note’s text—including Duane’s full name at the end of the
document—was entirely typed.64
Duane’s mother and the entity that served as Duane’s court-appointed conservator filed competing petitions for probate and appointment of a personal
representative.65 The past conservator, Guardianship and Alternatives, Inc.
(GAI), argued that the note constituted Duane’s will.66 Characterizing the note
as a failed holographic will, Duane’s mother argued that Duane had died intestate, making her his only heir.67 Following an evidentiary hearing, the probate
court held that the note constituted a valid will under Michigan’s harmless error
provision, which enacts UPC § 2-503 almost verbatim.68 Barely discussing the
electronic nature of Duane’s will, the Horton court emphatically affirmed the
lower court’s decision.69
58

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.24 (West 2019). This provision is arguably not a harmless
error provision at all, just as substantial compliance is not harmless error, but that is another
matter for another day.
59 In re Estate of Javier Castro, supra note 2, at 417–18. The court also suggested that “[i]f
Javier’s will had been created in Nevada, it would have complied with state law,” but
Javier’s e-will would not have met the requirements as passed in 2001. Id. at 418; see NEV.
REV. STAT. § 133.085 (2001), amended by NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085 (2017) (requiring,
among other things, an “authentication characteristic,” single “authoritative copy,” and designated custodian).
60 In re Estate of Horton, 925 N.W.2d 207, 212 (Mich. Ct. App. 2018).
61 Id. at 209.
62 Id. This journal entry existed in material, not digital, form. Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. Compare to Castro, which was uncontested. In re Estate of Javier Castro, supra note
2, at 415.
66 Horton, 925 N.W.2d at 209.
67 Id. at 210.
68 Id. at 210. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2503 (2019), with UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§ 2-503 (amended 2010). For UPC § 2-503 text, see supra note 41.
69
See Horton, 925 N.W.2d at 213–15.
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The court explained that “[Michigan’s harmless error provision] is an independent exception to the formalities required under [the state’s formal will provision, and it] does not require a decedent to satisfy . . . the requirements for a
holographic will.”70 The only formality required under the state’s harmless error statute is that the instrument be a “document or writing.”71 In a less direct
manner than the Castro court, the appellate court found that the harmless error
provision applies to electronic documents or writings.72 The court then turned
to review findings of Duane’s intent.73
After cataloguing the evidence presented, the court concluded that the record was sufficient to support the lower court’s finding that the “decedent clearly and unambiguous[ly] expressed his testamentary intent in the electronic document in anticipation of his impending death.”74 The court accordingly
affirmed the holding that GAI had met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the document presented for probate was intended as the
testator’s will.75
C. The Shortcomings of the Harmless Error Doctrine as Applied to E-Wills
As an initial matter, the probate of e-wills under a harmless error provision
is problematic in that its application is limited by the continued prevalence of
strict compliance.76 Further, harmless error provisions require that a will’s proponent prove validity under a clear and convincing standard.77 Reliance on
harmless error therefore imposes a higher burden of proof simply because testamentary intent was communicated digitally. This unnecessarily burdens both
the parties seeking probate and the courts fielding their petitions.78 Beyond
70

Id. at 212.
Id. The court contradicted itself slightly when stating that “no particular formalities [are]
necessary” to satisfy Michigan’s harmless error provision and then clarifying that “any document or writing can constitute a valid will provided that ‘the proponent of the document or
writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute’ . . . [t]he decedent’s will.” Id. at 211–12. (emphasis and alteration in original). Because Michigan’s harmless error provision mirrors UPC § 2-503, it similarly retains the writing requirement. See supra, Section II.A.
72 Compare In re Estate of Javier Castro, supra note 2, at 416 (“[T]he document prepared
. . . on Albie’s Samsung Galaxy tablet constitutes a ‘writing’ under [Ohio’s formal will provision]. To rule otherwise would put restrictions on the meaning of ‘writing’ that the General
Assembly never stated.”), with Horton, 925 N.W.2d at 211–12 (emphasizing that the harmless error provision includes “any document or writing” and stating that “[a] will need not be
written in a particular form” without directly addressing the electronic nature of Duane’s
will).
73 Id. at 213–14.
74 Id. at 213.
75 Id. at 215.
76 See supra Section II.A. Only seven states have adopted harmless error in its pure form.
Supra text accompanying note 40.
77 E.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010).
78 See UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, Approved Draft 2019) at 3; Developments in the Law, What Is an “Electronic Will”?, 131
71

350

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:1

these obvious and already articulated shortcomings, the harmless error doctrine
presents significant theoretical and practical problems.79
Because the harmless error rule retains the writing requirement that has always applied to formal and holographic wills,80 a will probated under the harmless error doctrine must comply with the writing requirement.81 As demonstrated by Castro and Horton, probating an e-will under the harmless error doctrine
therefore requires reading “writing” to include electronic writings.82 However,
if a court reads the plain language of a harmless error provision to include electronic writings, logic would seem to dictate that the writing requirement in
formal or holographic will provisions should likewise unambiguously include
electronic writings. Thus, both Castro and Horton arguably support the probate
of e-wills that comply with the formalities that define formal and holographic
wills, without reliance on the harmless error doctrine.
The Castro court expressly held that Ohio’s formal will provision “does
not require that the writing be on any particular medium.”83 Because Javier’s ewill was properly signed and attested, the court hung its hat on the lack of an
attestation clause when applying Ohio’s harmless error provision, even though
Ohio had never before considered the absence of an attestation clause to invalidate a formal will.84 If a testator were to include an attestation clause and otherwise correctly execute her e-will, the court would be hard-pressed to find a
reason for applying the harmless error provision, which plainly applies to wills
that are not executed in compliance with a jurisdiction’s required formalities.
An Ohio court would need to either engage in further judicial acrobatics to probate the e-will under harmless error or depart from Castro’s holding that electronic writings satisfy the formal will’s writing requirement. As discussed below, this would likely foreclose the application of harmless error to e-wills.
While the Horton court did not explicitly hold that the writing requirement
includes electronic writings, its application of the harmless error doctrine was
HARV. L. REV. 1790, 1797 (2018) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (recognizing that
some proponents would have difficulty meeting this burden).
79 Some have argued in support of the harmless error doctrine. Scott S. Boddery, Electronic
Wills: Drawing a Line in the Sand Against Their Validity, 47 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J.
197, 212 (2012) (arguing that “[p]rotecting testators from the uncertain nature of the digital
age while giving courts the ability to deviate from the Wills Act through the harmless error
doctrine and recognition of electronic drafting strikes the appropriate balance between convenience, formality, and intent effectuation,” without addressing any of the conceptual issues
raised herein); Gürer, supra note 35, at 1970–71 (arguing for the use of harmless error absent legislative action); Aubrey G. Smith, Note, Analyzing Holographic Wills in the Digital
Age: Should Florida’s Antagonistic Stance be Liberalized in Light of Other Jurisdictions'
Leniency?, 28 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 541, 561–62 (2018) (arguing that Florida, which
does not recognize holographic wills, “should dispense with the Wills Act Formalities and
allow digital holographic wills.”).
80 See supra Section II.A.
81 See supra Part I & Section II.A.
82 See supra Section II.B.
83 In re Estate of Javier Castro, supra note 2, at 416.
84
See supra Section II.B.
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premised on (1) the note’s non-compliance with the state’s formal and holographic will requirements, and (2) its compliance with the harmless error provision.85 Unlike the tablet e-will in Castro, Duane’s “final note” was unwitnessed
and therefore did not meet the statutory requirements for a formal will.86 Similarly, the note did not qualify as a holographic will because none of its provisions were handwritten by the testator.87 Accordingly, the instrument at issue
involved errors that prevented it from being probated as either a formal or holographic will, regardless of its electronic form.88 Nonetheless, once again, if a
testator were to comply perfectly with these requirements when executing an ewill, a Michigan court would be forced to either search for some mistake colorable as a formal deficiency (such as the lack of an attestation clause) to justify
its application of harmless error or creatively evade Horton’s implicit holding
that e-writings satisfy the writing requirement.
As suggested by the Castro court’s off-kilter reasoning and Horton’s silence, probating an e-will by simply holding that the writing requirement is satisfied by electronic writings is undesirable because it requires authorizing the
use of e-wills on the same terms as traditional wills without legislative approval.89 The Castro court’s reliance on the absence of attestation clause to move
outside its formal will provision demonstrates that as much as the court wanted
to allow Javier’s e-will into probate, it did not want to hold Javier’s e-will valid
under the plain language of Ohio’s formal will statute, which would have allowed for the use of e-wills on the same terms as traditional wills.90 Similarly,
Horton’s marked avoidance of the issue suggests that the court did not want to
hold that e-writings exist on par with material form written instruments.91
If a court moves beyond plain language to exclude electronic writings from
its formal or holographic will provisions in order to prevent the probate of a
compliant e-will, this exclusion would arguably apply to the harmless error
provision as well. Excluding e-writings from the writing requirement provided
85

See In Re Estate of Horton, 925 N.W.2d 207, 212 (Mich. Ct. App. 2018); see also supra
Section II.B.
86 Horton, 925 N.W.2d at 212.
87 Id.
88 Because Michigan’s harmless error provision does not require a signature, the court did
not reach the question as to whether a typed electronic signature satisfies this requirement. In
Taylor v. Holt, a Tennessee court held that a “computer generated signature” fulfilled the
signature requirement; however, there, the will was attested, and the witnesses saw the testator affix his signature to the document, which was then printed and executed in the traditional fashion by the witnesses. Taylor v. Holt, 134 S.W.3d 830, 833 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). Further, the testator used a “stylized cursive signature,” as opposed to regular font. Id. at 831.
89 See supra Section II.B.
90 See discussion supra Section II.B. As noted by the court, the outcome would have been
the same regardless of whether or not the e-will was admitted to probate because Javier’s
family would have followed the e-will’s instructions absent a court order. In re Estate of
Javier Castro, supra note 2, at 415–16. However, refusal to do so would have left future testators who chose to execute an e-will to rely on their family and friends to willingly affect
the testamentary intent expressed therein.
91
See Horton, 925 N.W.2d at 213–15.
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for by formal and holographic will provisions is not unreasonable considering
the history of wills formalities statutes, which originated in an era when there
were no digital alternatives for testators creating, executing, and safeguarding
wills. As discussed above, the problem arises in subsequently construing “document or writing” as required by the harmless error rule.92 The UPC adopted its
harmless error provision, Section 2-503, in 1990.93 Technology certainly was
not as limited in 1990 as in 1540, but digital communication was nowhere near
as prevalent then as it is today. It is unlikely that the drafters wrote, or legislatures subsequently adopted, Section 2-503 with electronic documents or writings in mind.94 The same is true for harmless error rules that are more stringent
than Section 2-503. Reading a material form requirement into the writing requirement of formal and holographic will provisions could effectively seal the
escape hatch offered by harmless error for the proponents of e-wills.
Moreover, while resort to harmless error is better than denying probate
when an e-will clearly expresses the testator’s intent, an approach premised on
non-compliance with traditional formal requirements does little to foster the
widespread use of e-wills. First, this approach does not make any space for virtual presence as accomplished by the use of electronic means and audiovisual
technology, which is crucial to fostering the use of e-wills as facilitated by
online DIY estate planning companies.95 Additionally, because harmless error
neither recognizes nor defines a valid e-will, it does not provide any sense of
security for testators seeking to execute testamentary instruments that are likely
to hold up in court.96 As a result, neither DIY estate planning companies nor
legal professionals would rely on such a provision. Finally, the harmless error
approach does not, and cannot, provide for a self-proving e-will.97 Utilizing a
self-proving will avoids the need to produce witnesses at the time of probate
and creates a presumption of validity; conversely, reliance on the harmless error doctrine requires producing clear and convincing evidence of testamentary
intent to overcome a presumption of invalidity98. As the use of a self-proving
92

UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010).
Gürer, supra note 35, at 1966.
94 See Langbein, supra note 41, at 52 (“Of the three main formalities . . . writing turns out to
be indispensable. Because section 12(2) requires a ‘document,’ nobody has tried to use the
dispensing power to enforce an oral will. Failure to give permanence to the terms of your
will is not harmless.”).
95 Because the execution of notarized and formal wills requires the presence of at least one
individual other than the testator, the success of online DIY estate-planning companies in the
e-wills arena requires the use of virtual presence. See supra Part I.
96 See supra Section II.A. (The harmless error doctrine allows courts to excuse noncompliance with certain formalities upon a clear and convincing showing of testamentary intent; it
does not create a set of requirements for valid e-wills).
97 See Michael J. Millonig, Electronic Wills: Evolving Convenience or Lurking Trouble?, 45
EST. PLAN. 27, 35 (2018) (“Harmless error statutes may allow admission of a will deficient in
one or more of the required formalities. These other situations require more proof and a hearing and ruling by the judge, which is contrary to the whole point of having a self-proved
written will automatically admitted to probate.”).
98
See supra Part I & Section II.A.
93
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will has become standard in estate planning,99 the inability to probate a selfproving testamentary instrument under the harmless error rule further cripples
the use of e-wills on a large scale.
In conclusion, the shortcomings of the harmless error approach are many
and the benefits few. This approach pressures courts to stretch and twist wills
statutes in an effort to do justice, reject the probate of e-wills altogether and
thereby embrace inequitable results, or engage in what may be seen by some as
judicial activism by recognizing e-wills on the same terms as traditional wills.
Further, this ad hoc approach fails to answer important questions about the validity of e-wills or provide any sense of security for testators, beneficiaries,
DIY companies, or attorneys.100 Legislatures should therefore respond directly
to the unique concerns raised by e-wills and provide testators with the tools
necessary to execute a valid e-will in a variety of contexts.101
III. E-WILLS IN THE LEGISLATURE: EVALUATING THE APPROACHES OF
LOBBYISTS AND SCHOLARS
The story of e-wills legislation begins with the growing acceptance of electronic transactions and remote notarization.102 In 1999, the Uniform Law

99

Matthew McDavitt, Trusts: Creation/Timing of Self-Proving Affidavits, NAT’L. LEGAL
RES. GROUP, INC.: THE LAWLETTER BLOG (Sep. 18, 2017, 11:09 AM), http://www.nlrg.com
/legal-content/the-lawletter/trusts-creation/timing-of-self-proving-affidavits [https://
perma.cc/UD7J-4TS5]; see James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for
Wills, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 541, 570 (1990); Bruce H. Mann, Self-Proving Affidavits and Formalism in Wills Adjudication, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 39, 41 (1985); Frederick F. Schneider, SelfProved Wills—A Trap for the Unwary, 8 N. KY. L. REV. 539, 542 (1981) (noting the value of
using a self-proving affidavit in practice).
100 Scott Boddery argues that the harmless error approach’s costs to the probate system are
mitigated by “the overpowering benefits of satisfying clear testamentary intent,” but as will
be discussed below, the paramount goal of giving effect to testamentary effect supports the
adoption of e-wills legislation, as demonstrated by the ULC’s decision to create uniform legislation. See Boddery, supra note 79, at 212; see also infra Part III.
101 Joseph Grant suggests legalizing e-wills by simply expanding the formality requirements
contained in existing wills statutes to apply to electronic writings, signatures, etc., but, as
discussed below, legislation directed at e-wills in particular is better suited to deal with the
particular questions of e-wills. This legislative approach brings the additional benefit of better facilitating future revisions in light of technological changes that simply will not affect
traditional, material form wills. See Joseph Karl Grant, Shattering and Moving Beyond the
Gutenberg Paradigm: The Dawn of the Electronic Will, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 105, 131–
34 (2008); see also infra Part III.
102 See Lisa Babish Forbes, Online Notaries Are Coming (And Why You Should Care), 29
PROB. L.J. OHIO 3, 3 (2018) (describing UETA, which provides for both electronic signatures
and notarization, as the precursor to remote notarization); Kyle B. Gee, The “Electronic
Wills” Revolution: An Overview of Nevada’s New Statute, The Uniform Law Commission’s
Work, and Other Recent Developments, 28 PROB. L.J. OHIO 126, 131 n.4 (2018) (“Given our
widespread reliance on electronic signatures in the global marketplace, the growing acceptance of the harmless error doctrine, the rapid invention and adoption of new technologies, the recent introduction of remote notarization in certain jurisdictions, and the influential
lobbying efforts of technology companies, we can expect to see more legislative activity to
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Commission promulgated the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA),
which has since enjoyed widespread adoption, but expressly does not apply to
testamentary instruments.103 The UETA provides for both electronic signatures
and electronic notarization to facilitate commercial transactions.104 A mere two
years later, Nevada became the first state to recognize the validity of e-wills.105
However, Nevada’s 2001 e-wills statutes did not usher in an era of electronic
wills because the restrictive requirements prevented testators from executing a
compliant e-will.106 The primary impediment to practical application was the
single authoritative copy requirement, criticized as a technological impossibility as recently as 2015.107 Nevada’s groundbreaking laws thus had only a nominal effect, and e-wills remained stagnant in state legislatures for over a decade.108
Then, in 2012, Virginia became the first state to authorize remote online
notarization (RON), which “allow[s] the person requesting the notarization and
the notary public to participate in the ceremony even when they are not in each
other’s physical presence.”109 Backed by the steady lobbying efforts of notary
associations and online notary companies, such as NotaryCam and Notarize,
RON laws have since gained momentum, creating the need for uniform model
legislation.110 This call has been answered by the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) and the American Land Title Association (ALTA), which finished

modernize laws governing the creation, execution, and storage of wills, trusts, powers of attorney, and other estate-planning documents.”).
103 Forbes, supra note 102. In 2000, Congress enacted the Electronic Signatures in Global
and National Commerce Act (E-SIGN), which similarly does not apply to testamentary instruments. Id.
104 See id.
105 Developments in the Law, supra note 78, at 1807.
106 Gerry W. Beyer & Claire G. Hargrove, Digital Wills: Has the Time Come for Wills to
Join the Digital Revolution?, 33 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 865, 898 (2007) (“[T]he Nevada statute,
passed more than six years ago, has never been implemented and it is unlikely that it will
ever be used unless the requirements are relaxed.”); Dan DeNicuolo, The Future of Electronic Wills: States are Slow to Adopt Them, and Lawyers are Even Slower to Take Advantage of
Laws Allowing Them, 38 BIFOCAL 75, 78 (2017) (Written before the passage of AB 413, the
article notes, “[t]hough electronic wills have been legal in Nevada since 2001, they are exceptionally rare. So rare in fact that Nevada estate attorneys are seemingly unanimous when
stating on their firms’ websites that they have never dealt with an e-will.”).
107 Jasmine Banks, Note, Turning a Won’t into a Will: Revisiting Will Formalities and EFiling as Permissible Solutions for Electronic Wills in Texas, 8 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY
PROP. L.J. 291, 301–02 (2015).
108 Gerry W. Beyer & Katherine Peters, Sign on the [Electronic] Dotted Line: The Rise of
the Electronic Will 1–3 (Feb. 23, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3278363 [https://perma.cc/42EU-WF4P]) (“In early 2017 and thereafter,
several state legislatures considered bills on electronic wills.”).
109 Gee, supra note 102, at 127.
110 Id. at 127–128; see Forbes, supra note 102; Tank et al., supra note 1 (“As of early May
2019, twenty-one states have passed and/or enacted RON laws.”).
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drafting model legislation in 2017, as well as the ULC with its 2018 Revised
Uniform Law on Notarial Acts (RULONA).111
The successful passage of RON laws revitalized the e-will in state legislatures, as DIY online estate planning companies harnessed their lobbying efforts
for e-wills legislation that authorizes virtual presence as conceived in the RON
context for the execution of testamentary instruments.112 Indeed, the 2017 ewills laws passed by the Nevada legislature were drafted and lobbied for by
Willing.com.113 The bill containing these amendments, AB 413, pertained not
only to e-wills, but simultaneously made the UETA as enacted in Nevada applicable to testamentary instruments and authorized electronic notarization via
the newly renamed Electronic Notarization Enabling Act.114 Because these laws
were drafted by a company with a pecuniary interest in the authorization of ewills, they are unsurprisingly more broad than the recently approved UEWA.
These models diverge in their approaches to providing for the formal validity of e-wills in three important respects.115 First, while the UEWA retained the
111

REVISED UNIF. LAW ON NOTARIAL ACTS (RULONA) at 127 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, Approved Draft 2018); MODEL LEGISLATION FOR REMOTE
ONLINE NOTARIZATION (MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS’N & AM. LAND TITLE ASS’N, Model Bill
2017); Forbes, supra note 102; Gee, supra note 102, at 127.
112 See Boddery, supra note 79, at 198–99; see also Gee, supra note 102, at 127 (“The first
new influence [behind the e-wills movement] is the diligent work of financially-motivated
entrepreneurs and owners of technology and software companies in the DIY online estate
planning sphere, such as Willing (owned by Bequest, Inc.) and LegalZoom); Developments
in the Law, supra note 78, at 1808. These companies, with their powerful lobbyists, are behind the current pressure to change the historical law of wills to enable citizens to create,
sign, and store estate planning documents entirely online without the need for physical presence interaction with any other person during the entire process including legal counsel.”).
113 See DeNicuolo, supra note 106, at 78; see also Letter from Michael Delgado, Gen.
Counsel, Bequest, Inc., to Steve Yeager, Chair, Senate Jud. Comm. (Apr. 6, 2017) (available
at https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/REL/79th2017/ExhibitDocument/OpenExhibit
Document?exhibitId=30393&fileDownloadName=0407AB413_delm_testimony.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B3UM-VCTF]).
114 A.B. 413, 2017 Leg., 79th Sess. 3–8, 19 (Nev. 2017).
115 Another importance difference between the UEWA and Nevada law is their choice of
law provisions. This difference is not explored fully because it does not directly bear on will
formalities. Yet, Nevada’s approach is so bold that it requires at least some attention.
Nevada law dictates that an e-will “executed or deemed to be executed in or pursuant to the
laws of this State may be proved and letters granted in the county in which the decedent was
a resident at the time of his or her death or the domicile or registered office of the qualified
custodian exists.” NEV. REV. STAT. § 136.185 (2017). Under Nevada law, an e-will may be
deemed to be executed in Nevada or pursuant to its laws when:
(1) The person executing the document states that he or she understands that he or she is executing, and that he or she intends to execute, the document in and pursuant to the laws of this State;
(2) The document states that the validity and effect of its execution are governed by the laws of
this State;
(3) Any attesting witnesses or an electronic notary public whose electronic signatures are contained in the document were physically located within this State at the time the document was
executed in accordance with this section; or
(4) In the case of a self-proving electronic will, the electronic will designates a qualified custodian who, at the time of execution:
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writing requirement for all electronic wills, Nevada’s amendments nixed the
requirement altogether.116 Second, unlike Nevada’s recently amended e-wills
laws, the UEWA does not provide for a holographic e-will.117 Quite the contrary, the UEWA gives states the option to restrict e-wills to those that are attested
by witnesses “each of whom is a resident of a state and physically located in a
state at the time of signing and who signed . . . in the physical presence of the
testator.”118 Third, the two models employ markedly different requirements for
the execution and probate of a self-proving e-will.119 These statutory schemes
should learn from each other. Both Nevada law and the UEWA should strike a
balance in the removal of the writing requirement. Further, the UEWA should
at least give states the option to recognize a holographic e-will as Nevada law

(I) If a natural person, is domiciled in this State; or
(II) If an entity, is organized under the laws of this State or whose principal place of business is
located in this State.

Id. § 133.088(e). Thus, a testator need not have any connection to Nevada, other than the
utilization of a Nevada qualified custodian in order to probate her e-will in Nevada. Unlike
the UEWA’s approach, Nevada’s approach represents a radical divergence from the status
quo.
Under traditional rules, a court has primary jurisdiction if the testator was domiciled there at
the time of death, and ancillary jurisdiction if the testator owned property in that jurisdiction
at the time of death. In most states, probate courts have discretion as to the acceptance of
jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 314 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.
1971); A GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING: DRAFTING, COMPLIANCE, AND
ADMINISTRATION STRATEGIES 6, 65 (Jeffrey A. Schoenblum ed., 2000). A court with ancillary jurisdiction over personal property will often postpone action when a will has already
been admitted for probated in the primary (domiciliary) jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 314 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1971); A GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING, supra, at 6. This abstention reflects respect for the principle of comity, under which states relinquish jurisdiction in recognition of another state’s
authority to adjudicate the matter. A GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING, supra, at
65; Comity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“ ‘Comity,’ in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will,
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are
under the protection of its laws.”) (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64, (1895)).
Nevada courts are unlikely to honor this jurisdictional provision. Instead, the courts are likely to exercise their discretion in rejecting probate jurisdiction out of respect for the foundational principle of comity. Thus, Nevada e-wills law should likely be amended to reflect the
UEWA’s choice of law provision (section 4) and the jurisdictional provision should be removed entirely so that the probate court’s jurisdiction over e-wills is exercised in the same
manner as its jurisdiction over traditional wills. See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 136.010, 136.260
(2019).
116 Compare UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 5(a)(1) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS, Approved Draft 2019), with NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085(1)(b)(1) (2017).
117 Compare UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 5(a) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS, Approved Draft 2019), with NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085(1) (2017).
118 UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 5(a)(3)(A) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS, Approved Draft 2019).
119 Compare UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 8 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS, Approved Draft 2019), with NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.086(1) (2017).
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does. Finally, Nevada law should amend its self-proving e-will requirements to
reflect the approach taken by the UEWA.
A. Removal of the Writing Requirement
In passing AB 413, the Nevada legislature boldly went where no legislature
has gone before: casting aside the writing requirement entirely and without imposing a higher burden of proof.120 Somewhat surprisingly, Nevada’s jettisoning of this elemental requirement has received little scholarly attention.121 Thus,
even though legal commentators have dedicated an impressive number of keystrokes to exploring whether electronic wills can meet the functions of Wills
Act formalities,122 the question as to how well unwritten e-wills in particular
serve the policies that underlie those traditional formalities remains a fairly
open one.

120

See NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.086 (2017).
See Robert I. Aufseeser, What Writings Are Adequate to Qualify for Probate?, 45 EST.
PLAN. J. 30, 32 (2018) (noting the uniqueness of Nevada’s e-wills statute without discussing
its removal of the writing requirement); Boddery, supra note 79, at 199–201, 204, 210–11
(laying out Nevada’s new laws without calling attention to removal of writing requirement
and suggesting that the writing requirement is indispensable for its evidentiary and cautionary function without directly addressing its removal under Nevada law); Gee, supra note
102, at 128 (claiming that the first controversial aspect of NV e-wills laws is its authorization
of an “authentication characteristic” e-will because “under Nevada’s new law, it appears that
a private video recording by the testator, could constitute a valid will” without recognizing
that the removal of the writing requirement applies to all e-wills); DeNicuolo, supra note
106, at 78 (recognizing the existence of AB 413 without discussing the removal of the writing requirement); Beyer & Peters, supra note 108, at 3 (laying out Nevada’s e-wills requirements without highlighting removal of writing requirement). But see Beyer & Hargrove, supra note 106, at 875–86 (exploring the policies behind the writing requirement at length,
discussing the evidentiary uses of audio recordings and videotapes, and noting arguments
that a videotaped will may constitute a “writing” under the UPC, but still without directly
addressing the removal of the writing requirement because written prior to 2017 amendments); Gerry W. Beyer, Videotaping the Will Execution Ceremony–Preventing Frustration
of the Testator’s Final Wishes, 15 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 54–55 (1983) (arguing that videotaped
wills satisfy the policies behind the writing requirement).
122 See Boddery, supra note 79, at 208–11; Christopher J. Caldwell, Should “E-Wills” Be
Wills: Will Advances in Technology be Recognized for Will Execution?, 63 U. PITT. L. REV.
467, 479, 481–84 (2002) (arguing that “technology would [often] serve the functions of the
will formalities significantly better than many valid holographs,” and discussing three potential solutions for the authorization of e-wills, i.e. abolishing the formalities, substantial compliance, and harmless error); Grant, supra note 101, at 118–20, 124, 131 (advocating that
states “follow Nevada’s lead” to provide the testator with electronic options without sacrificing the evidentiary, cautionary, protective, and channeling functions); Horton, supra note 27,
at 551, 563, 568–69, 571, 573–75 (2017) (proposing a movement away from the “intent paradigm” and suggesting that an alternative “anti-externality function” justifies refusal to recognize e-wills at this point in time); Millonig, supra note 97, at 27–28, 31–35 (providing a
brief history of wills law, including the functions of formalities, and arguing against the
adoption of e-wills in light of their inability to adequately fulfill these functions); Banks, supra note 107, at 312–16; Developments in the Law, supra note 78, at 1791–92 (proposing
three categories of e-wills and providing a functional analysis thereof).
121
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Unlike the Nevada legislature, the ULC decided to retain the writing requirement for e-wills.123 Retaining the writing requirement finds support in the
channeling and cautionary functions, but this retention does not need to be absolute. In essence, a balance should be struck between the complete extinguishment featured in Nevada’s laws and the complete survival promoted by
the current UEWA draft. This balance entails two, non-mutually exclusive solutions: (1) the writing requirement should be removed for all holographic ewills (but retained for formal and notarized e-wills),124 and (2) the harmless error rule as applied to e-wills should excuse non-compliance with the writing
requirement.
As Nevada has not adopted a harmless error provision, the second solution
does not apply to its e-wills law. Additionally, since only about half of the
states provide for holographic wills and only eleven have adopted some version
of the harmless error rule, the UEWA would provide these solutions as options.
Indeed, even jurisdictions that recognize traditional holographic wills or embrace harmless error may nonetheless be hesitant to probate non-written ewills. The ability to opt in would not significantly undermine the uniformity of
the UEWA because the probate of holographic wills and invocation of harmless
error arises under exceptional circumstances only, i.e. neither represent the
norm, and jurisdictions already vary considerably as to the liberality and details
of their formality requirements for holographic wills and their harmless error
provisions.125
1. The UEWA Should Provide for Non-Written Holographic E-Wills, but
Nevada Should Limit its Removal of the Writing Requirement to
Holographic E-Wills
In his seminal article, “Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act,” Langbein began his discussion of the purposes of Wills Act formalities with the
claim that “the entire law of wills derives from the premise that an owner is entitled to dispose of his property as he pleases in death as in life,” and the formalities aim to ensure that a testator’s estate “really is distributed according to
his intention.”126 In other words, freedom of disposition is the foundational policy in wills law much as freedom to contract is a core underpinning of contracts
law, and both wills and contracts require adherence with certain formalities that
123

UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 5 cmt. requirement of a writing (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, Draft for Approval 2019) (requiring a text record) (“An audio or audio-visual recording of an individual describing the individual’s testamentary wishes does not, by itself, constitute a will . . . . However, an audio-visual recording of the execution of a will can provide valuable evidence concerning the [will’s] validity. . . .”).
124 As argued in the following sub-section, the UEWA should include an optional holographic e-will provision. See infra Section III.B. Because Nevada authorizes the probate of
holographic e-wills but has not adopted the harmless error doctrine, it should amend its ewills laws to limit the removal of the requirement to the holographic e-wills already recognized under NRS § 133.085. See supra Section II.A.
125 See supra Part I.
126
Langbein, supra note 19, at 491–92.
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derive from the Statute of Frauds to serve the evidentiary, channeling, cautionary, and protective policies that in turn further the freedom to control one’s
property.127
Langbein recognized, however, that not all functions (or formalities) are
created equal.128 Wills law is fundamentally different than contract law not only
in its non-commercial nature, but also because, absent ante-mortem probate, the
will is proved when the individual whose expectations should be given effect is
now dead.129 The evidentiary function is accordingly particularly important in
wills law, and the primary function of the Wills Act formalities is therefore evidentiary.130 The writing requirement has historically served this function by
“assur[ing] that ‘evidence of testamentary intent be cast in [a] reliable and permanent form.’ ”131 Unlike written wills, non-electronic oral wills are “especially
deficient” in their fulfillment of this function.132 However, because technology
has advanced quite a bit since 1540, and even since 1975 when Langbein published his seminal article, the writing requirement is no longer indispensable for
its evidentiary function.
Though subordinate to the evidentiary function, the channeling and cautionary functions are more important than the protective function.133 The writing requirement serves the channeling function by promoting the use of standardized language and methods of expression that are clearly associated with
wills.134 A testator could arguably read a standardized script and accomplish the
127

See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 804 (1941); Ashbel
G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 5,
14–15 (1941); Langbein, supra note 19, at 490, 492–96; Philip Mechem, The Requirement of
Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments,
21 ILL. L. REV. 341, 351 n.24 (1926) (quoting A.W. Scott, Conveyances upon Trusts not
Properly Declared, 37 HARV. L. REV. 653 (1924)).
128 Langbein, supra note 19, at 492 (“Several discrete functions can be identified and ascribed to the formalities; however, we shall see that in modern practice they are not regarded
as equally important.”).
129 Ashbel G. Gulliver and Catherine Tilson explicated the “Dead Man’s policy” in their
similarly seminal article which proceeded and influenced Langbein’s piece, wherein he
coined the term. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 127, at 4; Langbein, supra note 19, at 501.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 492–93.
132 Id. at 493. These oral wills must be later reduced to writing, yet because they are orally
communicated and the later recording is fashioned from the witnesses’ recollection of the
testator’s oral expression, non-electronic oral wills are not comparable to electronic holographic wills that are recorded at the time of expression, either in a text or audiovisual (or
simply audio or visual) record, and therefore are not “deficient” in their fulfillment of the
evidentiary function. For oral will requirements, see discussion supra Part I in n.5.
133 See Langbein, supra note 19, at 494–97 (this hierarchy is reflected not only in the ordering of the formalities, but the assertion that the channeling function is particularly important
in the wills context as compared to contracts law, the defense of the cautionary function due
to the lack of the “wrench of delivery,” and the borrowed characterization of the protective
policy as a “historical anachronism”) (quoting Philip Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery
in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 21 ILL.
L. REV. 341, 348 (1926)).
134
Id. at 494.
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same result, but the language of wills, like most legal terminology, is not wellsuited for oral expression, especially by laypersons unfamiliar with these
terms.135 While the use of any particular language is not necessary to the creation of a formal or notarized will,136 lawyers and DIY companies alike often
rely on formal legal language to ensure that the document is clearly recognizable as a will.137 The standardization accomplished by written forms facilitates
the probate process, preventing false negatives and preserving judicial resources.138
Some holographic wills, particularly those that do not result from the testator filling out a standardized form, do not serve the channeling function particularly well because their forms likely do not employ standard language and their
executions do not carry the mark of “a virtually unmistakable testamentary
act,” i.e. the involvement of witnesses or a notary.139 Granted, written expression arguably encourages clarification of thought, as testators (hopefully) write,
re-read, and revise as necessary,140 but the same may be said for non-written
recordings, which a testator may review, delete, and re-record.
Almost fifty years ago, Langbein argued that writing serves the cautionary
function because “talk is cheap,” and without the writing requirement, a testator
“may make seeming testamentary dispositions inconsiderately, without adequate forethought and finality of intention.”141 Langbein provided the example
of an individual simply stating, “I want you to have the house when I’m gone,”
seemingly in the context of a casual conversation.142 Importantly though, Langbein maintained that “[m]ore important than the requirement of written terms is
that of written signature,” which is excusable under harmless error.143 As recognized by Langbein, even a written expression may be “merely a preliminary
draft, an incomplete disposition, or haphazard scribbling.”144 Indeed, it is foreseeable that instead of a casual conversation, the testator mailed a casual letter,
or more likely today, sent an informal email or text.145
135

See Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy,
53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 913, 945 (2013) (discussing the need for legal draftsmanship under the
current testamentary process and advocating a simplification of both language and process
by drawing on the income tax system and commercial products that facilitate the filing of tax
returns, which would remove the attestation requirement but retain the writing and signature
requirements because they “increase the reliability of wills”).
136 Again, no jurisdiction requires the use of an attestation clause for a formal will. This is
not true for a self-proving will, which does require a declaration or affidavit.
137 Beyer & Hargrove, supra note 106, at 879 (discussing how standardized language
demonstrates to courts that the testator did in fact possess testamentary intent).
138 Id. at 880.
139 Langbein, supra note 19, at 494.
140 Beyer & Hargrove, supra note 106, at 879.
141 Langbein, supra note 19, at 495.
142 Id.
143 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (Amended 2010); Langbein, supra note 19, at 495.
144 Id.
145 Ironically, a seemingly casual letter could be probated today in one of the jurisdictions
that recognize holographic wills, whereas a formal electronic document most likely would
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The attestation requirement of a formal will also serves the cautionary
function by “[making a will’s execution] into a ceremony impressing the participants with its solemnity and legal significance.”146 Because a holographic will
is not attested, this ceremonial aspect is markedly absent. Thus, as noted by
Langbein, “[a] principal objection to holographic wills is that they serve the
cautionary function poorly.”147 With a quick nod to Kimmel’s Estate,148 Langbein concluded that “[n]ot all holographs are so problematic,” suggesting that
the benefits of accepting holographic wills for probate outweigh the costs.149
Because holographic wills do not serve the channeling or the cautionary
functions particularly well, but are nonetheless authorized under the UPC and
by a slight majority of states, neither of these functions offers a sufficient justification to retain the writing requirement for holographic e-wills.150 As demonstrated by this functional analysis, clinging to the writing requirement for the
holographic e-will finds little support in the policies behind Wills Act formalities. Rather, unqualified adherence to the writing requirement this far into the
digital revolution seems primarily a “historical anachronism.”151
The unifying policy of freedom of disposition supports the removal of the
writing requirement for holographic e-wills. In contract law, agreements governed by the Statute of Frauds can be enforced under the equitable concept of
promissory estoppel even if they were made orally and never recorded in writing.152 As a non-written recording’s satisfaction of the evidentiary function is
sufficient to overcome the dead man problem, it is simply inequitable to force
intestacy upon the few testators who may utilize non-written electronic recordings to create rare unwitnessed e-wills in jurisdictions that recognize material
form holographic wills to avoid false negatives in similar situations. The

not be accepted for probate unless the jurisdiction has either a harmless error provision or ewills laws.
146 Langbein, supra note 19, at 495.
147 Id.
148 In re Kimmel’s Estate, 123 A. 405, 405–07 (Pa. 1924). A famous case in which the court
accepted for probate “a short, half-literate letter to two of [Kimmel’s] sons” that was simply
signed “Father.” SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 199; Langbein, supra note 19, at
495.
149 Id. at 496.
150 The protective function simply does not apply to holographic wills at all: “Because they
lack attestation, holographic wills make no pretense of serving the protective function. ‘A
holographic will is obtainable by compulsion as easily as a ransom note.’ ” Langbein, supra
note 19, at 497. A non-written electronic recording actually may serve the protective function better than the writing requirement in the case of a holographic e-will, as it provides a
record of the testator’s general disposition at the time when the testamentary expressions are
being recorded. See Beyer & Hargrove, supra note 106, at 884 (discussing the value of videotaping an execution ceremony).
151 See Langbein, supra note 19, at 496–97 (explaining how the protective policies, of which
the writing requirement is a part, were recognized during the ancient beginnings of testamentary documents).
152 E.g., Davis v. Nelson, 880 S.W.2d 658, 666 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (“Missouri recognizes
several exceptions [to the statute of frauds], one of which is promissory estoppel.”).
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UEWA should therefore be amended to allow for the digital communication of
testamentary intent in these exceptional situations.
Alternatively, the writing requirement should be preserved for formal and
notarized e-wills because the writing requirement does indeed serve the channeling and cautionary functions for these e-wills.153 Like their material counterparts, formal e-wills are likely to be more routinely created and probated
precisely because they represent the institutional norm (and also because they
carry the potential to be self-proving), so it is valuable to promote and facilitate
the use of standard forms. Though notarized e-wills may not enjoy widespread
adoption, considering only two states currently recognize the validity of notarized wills, the notarial act benefits from a written, standardized form, as
demonstrated by the proliferation of fillable estate planning documents, such as
beneficiary or guardian designations, durable or healthcare powers of attorney,
and advance medical directives.154 Similarly, when considered in conjunction
with the attestation or notarization requirement, the act of executing a written
document imbues the electronic execution ceremony with formality, just as it
does for an in-person ceremony. Since the writing requirement furthers more
than the evidentiary policy in the context of formal and notarized wills, it
should be retained for formal and notarized e-wills.155 Nevada should amend its
e-wills laws accordingly.156
2. The UEWA Should Excuse Non-Compliance with the Writing
Requirement
Even in the context of a formal or notarized e-will, the satisfaction of the
writing requirement is no longer the only reliable and widely accessible way to

153

Much has been made of the potential for alteration of electronic records in general, injecting new grandeur into the protective function, but audio-visual records are arguably more
difficult to alter than text records, so this function hardly justifies its retention, especially
since the formalities do not serve the protective function particularly well even in the context
of attested or notarized wills. Langbein, supra note 19, at 496.
154 UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT prefatory note (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE
L., Draft for Approval 2019).
155 While notarized wills are not widely accepted, suggesting that jurisdictions adopting
UEWA may choose not to recognize notarized e-wills, the writing requirement should similarly apply because the premise underlying the notarized will is that an individual authorized
to undertake notarial acts essentially replaces the attesting witnesses in observing the testator
execute the will, and the notarial act becomes a formality marker in the same manner as the
act of attestation. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (Amended 2010) (grouping attested and
notarized wills).
156 Nevada employs two separate provisions for formal and holographic wills. NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 133.040, 133.090 (2019). A single provision is used for e-wills, but this provision
could separate attested and notarized e-wills from holographic e-wills, much as UPC § 2-502
separates attested and notarized wills from holographic wills. Compare NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 133.085 (2017), with UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (amended 2010). The language of NRS
§ 133.085 would remain substantially similar; however, “in writing” would simply be added
to the introductory requirements for attested and notarized wills and remain absent from the
language introducing holographic e-wills.
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fulfill the evidentiary function. It is subsequently no longer indispensable.157
Although the ULC Drafting Committee did not provide a comment explaining
its decision to retain the writing requirement in its harmless error provision, it
does indicate in a comment to the proposed provision governing execution that
“writing emphasizes seriousness of intent.”158 This suggests that the Committee
retained the writing requirement for its connection to the cautionary function.
However, UPC Section 2-503 excuses both the signature and attestation requirements upon a clear and convincing showing that the instrument presented
for probate is a will.159 These requirements are as vital as—if not more vital
than—the writing requirement to the channeling and cautionary policies furthered by formal wills.160
As discussed above, holographic wills do not serve the channeling function
well because, despite being recorded in writing, they do not involve “a virtually
unmistakable testamentary act.”161 Even if an attested will is handwritten by a
layperson who does not utilize typical testamentary language or form, the mere
act of having the will attested communicates to the court that the document being presented for probate is a will.162 The attestation requirement is therefore
more effective than the writing requirement in serving the channeling function.
To a lesser degree, the same is true for a signature, which demonstrates that the
document is not simply a draft or note to oneself.163
Similarly, as noted earlier, the signature requirement serves the cautionary
function better than the writing requirement.164 Further, while less important
than the signature requirement in this context, attestation serves the cautionary
requirement because, as a crucial part of the formal execution ceremony, the act
of attestation communicates to testators the “solemnity and legal significance”
of the testamentary act being undertaken.165 Once again, despite the primacy of
the signature and attestation requirements in satisfying the channeling and cautionary functions, the UPC treats both as excusable.
In the case of e-wills then, courts should similarly be given the power to
dispense with the writing requirement upon a showing of clear and convincing
evidence that the record submitted for probate expresses the testator’s intent.166
As harmless error requires intensive factual inquiry and applies in an ad hoc
manner, this alteration will avoid false negatives in a narrow range of cases, ra157

Contra Langbein, supra note 41, at 52 (Langbein, a member of the Drafting Committee,
initially defended the writing requirement as “indispensable” for its evidentiary function).
158 UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 5 cmt. (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS, Approved Draft 2019) (requirement of a writing).
159 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (Amended 2010).
160 See supra Section II.A.
161 Langbein, supra note 19, at 494.
162 Id. at 495.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 This may be accomplished by simply substituting the term “electronic record” for “text
record” in the harmless error provision contained UEWA’s current draft.
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ther than altering the status quo. This is similar to the proposal that holographic
e-wills should not be subject to the writing requirement in that its effect is minimal, as the application of harmless error represents the exception, not the
norm. These alterations will not lead to a flood of litigation or an abundance of
non-written e-wills any more than the authorization of traditional holographic
wills or enactment of a conventional harmless error rule.167
B. The UEWA Should Recognize the Holographic E-Will Created under
Nevada Law
Unlike the UEWA, Nevada recognizes a holographic e-will.168 Under Nevada law, the holographic e-will must be dated, signed by the testator, and include an “authentication characteristic of the testator.”169 Nevada defines “authentication characteristic” as “a characteristic of a certain person that is unique
to that person and that is capable of measurement and recognition in an electronic record as a biological aspect of or physical act performed by that person.”170 The Nevada statute provides several examples: “a fingerprint, a retinal
scan, voice recognition, facial recognition, video recording, a digitized signature.”171 These examples are merely illustrative, as the provision clarifies that
“authentication characteristic” may also refer to “other commercially reasonable authentication using a unique characteristic of the person.”172
Nevada does not explicitly label its “authentication characteristic” e-will as
a holographic e-will.173 Still, because the testator’s inclusion of an “authentication characteristic,” i.e. something unique to the testator, de-necessitates the
presence of any other individuals for the execution process, the “authentication
characteristic” e-will authorized by Nevada essentially creates an electronic analogue to the traditional holographic will.174 In other words, the “authentication
characteristic” requirement mirrors the handwriting requirement because it acts
as a substitute for the attestation requirement by providing evidence of genu167

See Langbein, supra note 41, at 51–52.
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085 (2017). Like UEWA, Nevada also recognizes formal and
notarized e-wills. Compare id., with UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 5 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, Approved Draft 2019). Interestingly, Nevada does not recognize material form notarized wills. Nevada law should arguably be amended to validate
notarized testamentary instruments in both material and electronic form. RON requirements
are more stringent than the requirements for in-person notarization as a result of the limitations of virtual, as opposed to physical, presence. If a state is comfortable with the execution
of e-wills using RON, the refusal to recognize wills notarized in the testator’s physical presence makes little sense.
169 NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Under the 2001 e-will laws, an “authentication characteristic” was required for all ewills. Id. Assembly Bill 413 expanded the definition of “authentication characteristic” to include video recordings and other commercially reasonable forms of authentication. A.B.
413, 2017 Leg., 79th Sess. 12 (Nev. 2017).
173 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085.
174
See id.
168
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ineness.175 The value of recognizing a holographic e-will retraces the value of
recognizing a traditional holographic will. The holographic e-will expands the
ways in which testators can unilaterally execute an inexpensive testamentary
instrument and provides for the use of technology when the testator is faced
with extreme circumstances.
The holographic e-will provides for the single-handed execution of ‘fill in
the blanks and sign on the dotted line’ electronic documents.176 By using programs that allow her to fill out these e-documents, attach an electronic signature and date, and include an “authentication characteristic,” a twenty-first century testator can execute an electronic will without legal counsel, without
witnesses, without notarization, and without ever leaving the privacy of her
home.177 The holographic e-will bestows validity upon this unilateral process,
just as the holographic will “[brought] an unattested printed-form will, executed in private on a sheet obtained from a stationery store, drugstore, or gasoline
station . . . within the Wills Act.”178
Even if a jurisdiction approves the non-written holographic e-will, companies will likely use the written form that requires the testator’s signature, thus
serving the channeling function.179 These unilateral executions also serve the
cautionary function. If a testator purchases a program labeled, for example,
Turbo Wills, it seems reasonable to assume that she understood her act as a testamentary one. This is especially true because these programs are extremely
likely to include disclosures describing the legal effect of the e-document being

175

See Langbein, supra note 19, at 493, 498.
Reid Kress Weisbord promotes a similar concept in his 2012 article, “Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt. Out of Intestacy,” wherein he argues, among other things, that
the attestation requirement should be abolished entirely and “the state should provide complimentary software akin to the commercial ‘TurboTax’ program.” Weisbord, supra note
135, at 880–81. Adopting a holographic e-wills provision is considerably less drastic than
completely eliminating the attestation requirement, and private companies, like TurboTax,
will undoubtedly take advantage of such a provision, eliminating the need for government
action. See above, discussing the importance of lobbying by estate planning companies in
kicking of the recent e-wills feeding frenzy. It would perhaps be ideal if the government or
interest groups provided free services, as is done for the preparation of tax returns, but this is
not particularly pressing in the context of wills since the reality is that those who cannot afford even the less expensive alternatives to traditional legal counsel likely own a negligible
amount of property anyway. This is not to suggest that wills law should only be concerned
with property of high monetary value, but in those instances, it is less likely that disputes
will arise regarding the proper heir.
177 The creation and execution of a will is an inherently private act, and the ability to complete a testamentary act without sharing intimate details with unknown lawyers, witnesses,
and notaries may appeal to some testators who would otherwise be hesitant to execute a will.
178 Langbein, supra note 19, at 511.
179 In discussing the holographic will’s fulfillment of the channeling function, Langbein noted that “[t]he danger that holographic wills can impair the channeling function of the Wills
Act is actually minimized under the UPC provision. Like the will substitutes that the Code
seems to be imitating, the unattested printed-form wills it invites serve the channeling policy
especially well.” Id. at 512.
176
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created and executed.180 Considering the available technology, these programs
would allow for the execution of a holographic e-will in a way that continues to
serve, and may in fact better serve, the handwriting requirement’s authenticity
function.181
The legal recognition of holographic e-wills also provides for situations
wherein the testamentary act stems from some pressing emergency or the possibility of death created by the testator’s undertaking a potentially dangerous
course of action.182 Devices capable of producing text, audio, visual, and audiovisual recordings—such as cell phones, smart watches, tablets, laptops, and
smart speakers—are readily accessible for many potential testators.183 Indeed,
in certain settings, some of these devices are likely more accessible than a pen
and paper. Many people—especially young individuals who are likely to draft a
will as a response to an emergency or immediate concern about their wellbeing—carry a smart phone at all times.184 If holographic wills exist, at least in
part, to provide individuals with a way to dispose of their property when death
is imminent, probable, or unusually possible, it makes little sense to forbid testators from using technology that is readily accessible.
Technology is not only pervasive in terms of physical possession, but also
reliance.185 If a 21st century testator was presented with the options of carving a

180

Companies should take precautions to ensure that the testator reads these disclosures.
They should not resemble or be conflated with terms of service, the language should be simple, and the most important parts emphasized with large, bold, capitalized text.
181 Smith, supra note 79, at 557–61. As suggested by Weisbord, this is likely true for holographic e-wills as well, and even when this is not the case, as observed by Smith, the utilization of neither an attorney or DIY company likely stems from necessity created by emergency, lack of necessity due to a small estate, inability to pay, or discomfort with formal
systems.
182 See id. at 552–53; see also SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 203–04 (discussing
wills made “in extremis” and conditional wills).
183 See Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2019), http://www.pewinternet.org/factsheet/mobile [https://perma.cc/95SP-2JQT].
184 See id.; see also Weisbord, supra note 135, at 903 (discussing the psychology of procrastination and noting that “[w]hen the task relates to an event in the distant future, nonperformance has a lesser immediate impact and is therefore more susceptible to delay”).
185 See Gee, supra note 55, at 151 (adopting a critical stance toward the Castro court’s claim
that Javier and his family “did not have any paper or pencil” and posing these rhetorical
questions: “Was there really no paper or pen available in the hospital within reasonable
reach? Did Javier and his brother even ask or was their first instinct to start writing electronically on the tablet? With so much of their lives reliant on hand-held technology, will young
adults and millennials today take the same actions as Javier and his brothers?”); Millonig,
supra note 97, at 31 (ignoring the growing reliance on technology when noting: “One might
wonder why Castro did not call a lawyer to come to the hospital and prepare a will for him
. . . Of course, this costs the client money. Castro was certainly not poor, as evidenced by the
items listed in his will. Even if he was, there are legal aid societies, bar association pro bono
programs, and will forms available online or from a bookstore. It should not have been that
difficult for someone to find a printer or one of these free will forms.”); Mobile Fact Sheet,
supra note 183.
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writing into a tractor or recording a note or video on a cell phone,186 it seems
exceedingly unlikely that the testator would choose the former over the latter,
unless intimately familiar with wills law.187 Similarly, it is foreseeable that a
testator on the way to the airport or heading into surgery would send a text or
email using a mobile phone, as opposed to creating and signing a handwritten
note.188 Technology facilitating digital communication is ubiquitous in modern
life. If the law of wills recognizes this in providing for attested and notarized ewills, even though these executions are planned in advanced, it should surely
recognize this fact of modern life in the case of holographic e-wills as well.
In light of these considerations, and because the UPC gives states the option to recognize traditional holographic wills,189 the UEWA should provide
states with the ability to recognize holographic e-wills.190
C.

Nevada’s Self-Proving E-Will Provisions Should be Amended to Align
with the UEWA

Nevada’s 2017 amendments and the UEWA both provide for a selfproving e-will.191 Like a traditional self-proving will, a self-proving e-will must
incorporate declarations or affidavits executed by the attesting witnesses before
an individual authorized to administer oaths under the applicable law.192 Unlike
Nevada, the ULC differentiates between e-wills executed under conditions like
those of Castro, where the attesting witnesses are physically present, from ewills witnessed via virtual presence.193 The latter is optional, so states may
186

This is assuming she had no service, otherwise she could simply use her phone to call for
help.
187 SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 203 (discussing the famous tractor fender will
case).
188 Smith, supra note 79, at 542 (discussing a client who sent his lawyer a text before going
into surgery in order to convey that he intended to revoke his formal will and expressing his
testamentary intent).
189 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (amended 2010); Langbein, supra note 19, at 491 (noting
that the UPC “makes liberal provision for holographs”).
190 The revision to UEWA should mirror the structure of UPC § 2-502, while adopting the
language employed by Nevada. To make the holographic e-will requirements more stringent,
the Drafting Committee could adopt the “authentication characteristic” definition as used by
Nevada in 2011 as opposed to 2017. Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085(6)(a) (2001),
amended by NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085 (2017) with NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085(5)(a)
(2017). If handwriting is sufficient to show genuineness, surely a fingerprint, retinal scan,
voice recognition, facial recognition, or digitized signature would also suffice. Importantly,
the “authentication characteristic” requirement would be dispensable under UPC § 2-503.
191 NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.086 (2017); UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 8 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, Approved Draft 2019).
192 NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.086; UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 8 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, Approved Draft 2019). For self-proving will requirements,
see supra Part I.
193 UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 8 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS,
Approved Draft 2019). Unlike the self-proving will provided for under UPC § 2-504, which
may be made self-proving during or after execution, an e-will may not be made self-proving
any time after execution. Compare UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-504 (amended 2010), with
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choose to provide for a self-proving e-will when the witnesses are in the testator’s physical presence only. Where the execution ceremony is undertaken remotely, thus increasing the likelihood that testators and witnesses will be hundreds or even thousands of miles apart, the ability to use a self-proving e-will is
especially important, as it allows for the probate of an e-will without the need
for an attesting witness to appear before the court.
In addition to the traditional requirement that witnesses execute declarations or affidavits, Nevada also imposes a “qualified custodian” requirement for
self-proving e-wills.194 To be self-proving, the e-will must designate a qualified
custodian and remain “at all times under the custody of a qualified custodian”
prior to probate.195 The relatively stringent requirements for a self-proved ewill represent the flipside to Nevada’s otherwise liberal approach. Unlike testators or other parties in possession of an e-will, a qualified custodian is responsible for an electronic record that must include: (1) a visual record, such as a
photograph, of the testator and attesting witnesses at the time of execution; (2)
a photocopy, photograph, fax, or other visual record of documentation that
“provides satisfactory evidence of the identities of the testator and the attesting
witnesses”;196 and (3) an audiovisual recording that captures the execution cer-

UNIF. ELEC. WILLS ACT § 8 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, Approved Draft 2019).
194 NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.086 (2017).
195 Id. Because continuous custody is required, the new provision addresses how to transfer
custodianship if either the custodian or the testator choose to terminate their relationship. See
NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.310. If a qualified custodian wishes to terminate the custodianship, a
written thirty-day notice of termination must be provided to the testator and, if applicable,
the successor qualified custodian. Id. If there is no successor custodian, the appropriate records and the certified paper original must be delivered to the testator. Id. As NRS 133.086
mandates the continuation of custodianship, this would presumably extinguish the e-will’s
self-proving character. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.086. If designating a successor, the qualified custodian must provide that individual or entity the electronic record and an affidavit
certifying certain details regarding the custodian’s proper designation and handling of the
electronic record. NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.310. The testator may also terminate custodianship
by demanding that the certified original be provided or designating a successor qualified custodian. Id.; NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.330. Regardless of whether termination is initiated by the
qualified custodian or the testator, Nevada law requires properly transferring the electronic
record to a third party if the testator wishes to retain the e-will’s self-proving character. See
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 133.086, 133.310.
196 NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.320. This includes “documentation of the methods of identification used [to electronically notarize the e-will or related affidavits in compliance with Nevada law].” Id. An electronic notary may undertake a notarial act if the testator or witness:
(a) Is personally known to the notarial officer;
(b) Is identified upon the oath or affirmation of a credible witness who personally appears before
the notarial officer;
(c) Is identified on the basis of an identifying document which contains a signature and a photograph;
(d) Is identified on the basis of a consular identification card;
(e) Is identified upon an oath or affirmation of a subscribing witness who is personally known to
the notarial officer; or

Fall 2019]

WELCOMING E-WILLS INTO THE MAINSTREAM

369

emony.197 Though these requirements technically describe the “duties of [a]
qualified custodian,” by dictating the content of an e-will’s electronic record,
they impose additional formality requirements for a self-proving e-will.
The Nevada self-proving e-will also imposes safeguarding requirements,
perhaps to overcome concerns about the security of an electronic record. The
qualified custodian must store the electronic record in “a system that protects
electronic records from destruction, alteration or unauthorized access and detects any change to an electronic record.”198 By minimizing the potential for
fraudulent alteration, the expansion of safeguarding procedures furthers the
protective function more rigorously than traditional wills formalities, which
begin with creation and end with execution.199
Finally, the Nevada self-proving e-will is limited by who may serve as a
qualified custodian. First, to become a qualified custodian, “[a] person must execute a written statement affirmatively agreeing to serve as [such].”200 Thus, a
testator cannot unilaterally designate a qualified custodian, but must obtain the
custodian’s express consent, thereby foreclosing the existence of an inadvertent
qualified custodian.201 This means that storing an e-will using services like
DropBox or GoogleDocs extinguishes its self-proving character, even if there
were six witnesses physically present at the time of execution and all of them
executed declarations. Second, tracing the policy concerns underlying disinterested witness requirements, heirs and beneficiaries cannot serve as qualified
custodians.202 This effectively eliminates those close to testators from taking
charge of an e-will without extinguishing its self-proving character.
By creating an incentive to execute a formal e-will, both Nevada law and
the UEWA encourage the use of an attested, as opposed to a notarized or holographic, e-will. This is consistent with the traditional self-proving will. The
qualified custodian requirements contained in the Nevada 2017 amendments,
however, represent a significant alteration to the status quo by imposing additional formal requirements for a self-proving e-will’s electronic record,203 as
well as extensive safeguarding requirements for a self-proving e-will.204 These
deviations from the status quo are neither justified nor desirable.

(f) In the case of a person who is 65 years of age or older and cannot satisfy the requirements of
paragraphs (a) to (e), inclusive, is identified upon the basis of an identification card issued by a
governmental agency or a senior citizen center.

NEV. REV. STAT. § 240.1655 (2015).
197 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.086.
198 NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.320(2).
199 For the failure of existing formalities to further the protective policy, see supra Section
II.A.
200 NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.300(1).
201 See Developments in the Law, supra note 78, at 1807.
202 NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.320(1).
203 NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.086.
204 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 133.300–133.340. For traditional self-proving will requirements, see
supra text accompanying note 13.
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While the inclusion of records establishing the identities of the testator and
witnesses, as well as an audiovisual record of the execution ceremony may be
advisable, it should not be required. Notaries public are already required by law
to record identifying information.205 Further, practicing attorneys have long
recognized the benefit of recording the execution ceremony, and therefore undertake this recording voluntarily when anticipating a contest.206 The DIY
online estate planning companies seeking to facilitate the execution of e-wills
may similarly expend this effort voluntarily. The real-world value of recording
the execution ceremony is therefore a sufficient incentive, and mandatory recording should not suddenly be required for self-proving e-wills when it is not
mandatory for traditional self-proving wills.
The safeguarding requirements imposed under Nevada law find some support in the evidentiary and protective functions because they guard against the
fraudulent alteration of electronic records.207 This justification is ultimately unpersuasive though. Wills law has never imposed explicit requirements dictating
the manner in which a will is maintained during the testator’s life in order to
serve the evidentiary function.208 Instead, the law relies upon testators, or in
some instances their lawyers, to keep their wills in a safe location.209 As a result, concerns about authenticity are addressed when contestants of a will endeavor to provide evidence of fraud.210 Further, like the formalities, safeguard205

NEV. REV. STAT. § 240.120 (2017).
See Beyer & Hargrove, supra note 106, at 884.
207 Modernizing the Law to Enable Electronic Wills, WILLING, https://willing.com/learn/
modernizing-the-law-to-enable-electronic-wills.html [https://perma.cc/PS7X-RFJP] (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) (“If the law were to accept electronic wills alongside paper wills, it would
be important for judges to be able to identify the ‘original’ electronic record of the testator’s
will. This can be accomplished using current technology, in one of two ways: (1) by a statutory framework providing a safe harbor for the creation and storage of electronic documents
by a reliable custodian, or (2) using document security technology to track access and alterations to electronic wills bearing electronic signatures.”).
208 See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 4, at 197.
209 SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at 162. While the UPC does allow testators to deposit a will with the clerk of the probate court prior to death, this provision is rarely utilized.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-515 (amended 2010); SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 4, at
162. In some instances, the reliance on testators to safeguard their own wills has resulted in
the inability to locate the will after the testator’s death. Id. at 161. This may be an even more
prominent problem for e-wills nestled in the testator’s computer files, but this concern does
not justify imposing additional safeguarding requirements for testators to reap the benefits of
a self-proving e-will, which necessitates that an e-will has in fact been located and presented
for probate.
210 See, e.g., In re Hollenbeck’s Will, 318 N.Y.S.2d 604, 608 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1969) (“[T]he
contestants have the burden of proving fraud and undue influence”) aff’d sub nom. Matter of
Hollenbeck, 325 N.Y.S.2d 736 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971). A traditional attested will is not free
from fraudulent alteration post-execution, as pages prior to the signature page, which typically include the actual dispositions made, may be changed and re-affixed to the signature page.
Additionally, the signatures and notarization for a self-proving will could theoretically be
forged. Accordingly, “courts examine paper originals for markers of authenticity (such as ink
signatures) and evaluate any suspicious circumstances concerning their creation and storage.” Modernizing the Law to Enable Electronic Wills, supra note 207. Electronic docu206
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ing does not protect against fraud or duress affecting the original testamentary
act.211
The evidentiary and protective functions as unconvincing justification suggests that the primary importance of a self-proved e-will remaining in the custody of a qualified custodian may reflect the self-interested source of Nevada’s
2017 amendments—which were drafted by Willling.com, a subsidiary of an
online estate planning company, Bequest, Inc.212 The qualified custodian requirements ensure the involvement of estate planning companies in maintaining
the most desirable type of e-will recognized under Nevada law. This is true regardless of whether the self-proved e-will is executed using services provided
by a DIY company or the services of lawyers, who would likely contract with a
third party rather than take on the qualified custodian title themselves. Because
Nevada’s “qualified custodian” requirements likely flow from the desires of
self-interested private parties rather than from legitimate concern for the testator, Nevada’s self-proving e-will provisions should be amended to mirror the
UEWA approach.213
CONCLUSION
The law of wills is changing to make space for the increasingly important
role of technology in the everyday lives of the testators it aims to serve. Several
courts have relied on harmless error to probate e-wills in the absence of legislative action, but this solution is not well-suited to handle the probate of e-wills.
Considering the shortcomings of harmless error, the ubiquity of technology that
allows testators to move beyond the constraints of an analog execution process,
and the development of e-will processes within the wills and estates industry,
legislatures should move swiftly to authorize the use of e-wills. This move will
be made infinitely easier by the finalization of the UEWA, which will provide
the benefit of uniformity and promote the recognition of e-wills in an effort to
ments are susceptible to similar authenticity analysis. Id. (discussing the use of metadata to
determine whether an electronic document has been altered).
211 While courts continue to assert that a function of the formalities is to safeguard against
fraud, as explained by Gulliver and Tilson in 1945, the formalities are deficient in fulfilling
the protective function. See, e.g., Pickens v. Estate of Fenn, 251 So. 3d 34, 38 (Ala. 2017)
(“[T]he purpose of requiring the signature of two witnesses ‘is to remove uncertainty as to
the execution of wills and safeguard testators against frauds and impositions’ ”) (quoting
Culver v. King, 362 So. 2d 221, 222 (Ala. 1978)); In re Estate of Holmes, 101 So. 3d 1150,
1152– 53 (Miss. 2012) (“The[] formalities associated with attesting a will are important . . .
as safeguards against fraud by substitution of a different will than the one signed by the testator.”); Langbein, supra note 19, at 496–97.
212 DeNicuolo, supra note 106, at 78.
213 See Grant, supra note 101, at 135 (“In this debate, we must ask ourselves what is more
important: the ability of the attorney to advise and counsel their estate client, or that client’s
capacity to express their true testamentary wishes?”). This rhetorical question applies equally
to the ability of DIY companies to entrench themselves in the requirements for a self-proving
e-will. The fundamental principle of wills law is freedom of disposition. The pecuniary interest of companies like Bequest Inc. should not dictate the requirements for a self-proving
e-will.

372

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:1

further testamentary intent, rather than as a way to respond to the lobbying
pressure being exerted by DIY online estate planning companies.
Though the ULC offers an arguably more neutral statutory scheme, the efforts of the DIY online estate planning industry should not be dismissed out of
hand. The ULC should reconsider its approach in light of the benefits offered
by Nevada law. Similarly, the Nevada legislature should amend some aspects
of its e-wills laws to reflect the recently approved UEWA. Like the law of
wills, the law of e-wills should exist to serve the fundamental policy of freedom
of disposition. This goal is best served by striving for an equilibrium that balances the diverse needs of testators—some of whom may wish to adhere to tradition, some of whom may want to embrace the tools of DIY online estate
planning companies, and some of whom may need to express their testamentary
intent with whatever tools are available to get the job done.

